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Asymptotic Age Structures and
Intergenerational Trade
Gregory Ponthiere
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Abstract
While demographers Lotka (1939) and Lopez (1961) proposed condi-
tions on (exogenous) fertility and mortality laws under which populations
with distinct initial age structures exhibit the same asymptotic age struc-
ture, this paper re-examines the issues of age structure stabilization and
convergence, by considering a population whose fertility and mortality are
endogenously determined in the economy. For that purpose, we develop
a three-period OLG model where human capital accumulation and inter-
generational trade a¤ect fertility and longevity. It is shown that the age
structure must converge asymptotically towards a stable structure, whose
form depends on the structural parameters of the economy. Moreover,
populations with distinct initial age structures will end up with the same
long-run age structure when fertility and mortality laws are converging,
which requires converging terms of trade between coexisting generations
in the di¤erent populations under study.
Keywords: Age structure, OLG model, fertility, mortality, demographic
transition, intergenerational trade.
JEL codes: J11, J13, J14
1 Introduction
The history of mankind is, among other things, a history of cooperations - and
sometimes conicts - between coexisting generations. At any epoch, the coexis-
tence of individuals of di¤erent ages generated its own set of intergenerational
arrangements, duties and trades, whose goal was, quite often, to take advantage
of the age heterogeneity.1 But the age heterogeneity is also an output of inter-
generational relations, as fertility and longevity - and thus the age structure -
depend on the precise form of intergenerational settlements. Hence, the study
of the long-run dynamics of economies and populations requires to consider the
joint dynamics of age structures and intergenerational relations.
This paper aims precisely at developing a model of coexisting generations,
whose relative sizes are both an output and an input of intergenerational re-
lations. Our focus on the interplay between age heterogeneity and intergener-
ational relations will allow us, in particular, to study major mechanisms lying
behind the observed long-run dynamics of age structures.
Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris and PSE. E-mail: gregory.ponthiere@ens.fr
1Such intergenerational settlements include, for instance, child care, education activities,
long term care, and pensions paid by the young to the old.
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As this was stressed by demographers (see Lee, 2003), the age structure
of populations has been evolving signicantly across epochs. While human
societies were, at the middle of the 18th century, mainly composed of what
can be roughly called youngpersons, the share of the youngstarted falling
during the second part of the 19th century in industrialized economies, whereas
the shares of middle-aged and elderly people started growing, and kept growing
even more during the 20th century. That evolution is illustrated on Figure 1 by
the case of Sweden.2 The share of people younger than 35 years, which consisted
of about 68 % of the population around 1850, started falling after 1850, and
amounts today to only 42 % of the Swedish population.
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Figure 1: Age structure in Sweden, 1751-2008
This non-constancy of the age structure is mainly due to large changes in
fertility and mortality over time. Demographers regard the evolution of age
structures as an outcome of the demographic transition process: human societies
have, during the last two centuries, switched from a regime with a high fertility
and a high mortality to a regime with a low fertility and a low mortality.3 The
observed ageing of societies during the second part of the 19th century and the
20th century constitutes thus only a subproduct of those evolutions of births and
deaths. Hence, all economies having experienced the demographic transition are
also characterized by the evolution of age structure just described (see Figures
2 and 3 for England and Wales and France).4
In front of such sizeable evolutions of age structures over time, a natural
question to raise is the one of the likelihood of a stabilization of age structures:
can we expect that age structures will stabilize at some point in the future, and,
if yes, what will the stable age structure look like? Another natural question is
the one of the convergence of age structures across populations: will the long-run
age structure be the same in all populations?
In what is still regarded today as a major result of theoretical demography,
Alfred Lotka (1939) identied conditions that are su¢ cient for the asymptotic
stabilization of an age structure.5 The so-called Lotka Theorem states that,
2Sources: The Human Mortality DataBase (2008). See de la Croix, Lindh and Malmberg
(2009) for a study of long run demographic and economic changes in Sweden.
3See Lee (2003).
4Sources: The Human Mortality Database (2008).
5Note, however, that Lotka Theorem does not guarantee a stable population size, but only
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Figure 2: Age structure in England and Wales, 1841-2006
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Figure 3: Age structure in France, 1816-2008
provided (i) age-specic fertility rates are constant, (ii) age-specic death rates
are constant, (iii) age-specic migration rates are zero, a population must nec-
essarily end up, as time goes to innity, with a constant age structure, which
is independent from the initial age structure and size of the population. Lotka
Theorem states actually a result of strong convergence: populations tend, if sub-
ject to the same, constant fertility and mortality laws, to "forget their past",
which is a property known as strong ergodicity.6 That result, which concerns
stable populations (i.e. subject to constant fertility and mortality laws), was
generalized by Alvaro Lopez (1961) in the context of unstable populations (i.e.
subject to varying fertility and mortality laws), in what is known as a weak
convergence theorem. According to Lopez, if populations are subject to the
same time-varying fertility and mortality laws, populations with distinct initial
age structures must exhibit, in the long-run, the same age structure.
The importance of Lotka and Lopezs results for the economic study of hu-
a stable population structure, as whether the population size grows or falls depends ultimately
on the relative strengths of mortality and fertility.
6Note that, as stressed by Preston et al (2001, p. 146), Lotkas result can be extended to
the case of populations with the same age-specic migration rates, so that condition (iii) is
not crucial for Lotkas result.
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man societies could hardly be overemphasized.7 On the descriptive side, the
evolution of economic aggregates over time (production, consumption, savings,
employment, etc.) is dependent on how the population is structured in terms
of age.8 On the normative side, it is also clear that the age heterogeneity of
populations is a major source of concern for policy making. Thus, there is a
strong need to know under which conditions the age heterogeneity can stabilize.
However, those two contributions, made at the highest level of generality,
do not inform us about the precise form of the asymptotic age structure. To
answer that question, one must add assumptions on how fertility and mortality
are determined, and make explicit how these are inuenced by, among other
things, the form of intergenerational relations. But, as we shall see, endogenizing
fertility and mortality is not only relevant for characterizing asymptotic age
structures, but, also, for the restatement of the conditions guaranteeing the
convergence of age structure across populations.
For those purposes, we develop here a three-period overlapping genera-
tions model (OLG) with human capital accumulation, where both fertility and
longevity are endogenous, and analyze the dynamics of age structures under
that theoretical framework.9 In that economy, the di¤erent generations that co-
exist at each period of time are characterized by trade relations, in the spirit of
the seminal model by Ehrlich and Lui (1991). Young adults, as parents, transfer
resources to their children, in order to raise them and educate them, but they
transfer also resources to their own parents, so that intergenerational trade is
here oriented both downwards and upwards. But an important di¤erence with
respect to the model of Ehrlich and Lui, in addition to the endogeneity of mor-
tality, is that contribution rates to the children and the elderly are here not
constants, but variables depending on the level of human capital.
While the literature includes several OLG models with both endogenous
fertility and longevity (Blackburn and Cipriani, 2002; Gallor and Moav, 2005; de
la Croix and Licandro, 2007; Strulik and Weisdorf, 2008), the specicity of this
paper is that it pays a particular attention to the dynamics of the age structure,
and to its relationships with intergenerational trade. The present model shares
with Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) the three-period OLG structure with human
capital accumulation, but introduces intergenerational trade as a motive for
fertility decision, and considers the interplay between intergenerational trade
and age structure dynamics. The present paper shares also with Galor and
Moav (2005) the presence of a pure taste for children in the fertility decision,
but concentrates on age heterogeneity within the population rather than on
heterogeneity within each cohort. Finally, endogenous fertility and mortality
are also treated in a model of human capital accumulation by de la Croix and
Licandro (2007) and Strulik and Weisdorf (2008), but they concentrate on a
society without intergenerational trade, unlike the present framework.
Thus the particularity of this study is to concentrate on the interplay between
age heterogeneity, intergenerational trade and human capital accumulation, in
order to examine whether Lotka and Lopezs stabilization and convergence re-
sults remain true under endogenous fertility and mortality. It is shown that,
7On the relations between Lotka and Lopezresults, see Challier and Michel (1996).
8For a recent empirical study of the impact of age-structure on GDP growth, see Lindh
and Malmberg (2009).
9As such, this paper complements other theoretical pieces of work concerned with the
dynamics of age-structure, such as Boucekkine et al (2002), where mortality is exogenous.
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if children are treated both as consumption goods and as investment goods by
their parents, the age structure must asymptotically converge towards a stable
structure, whose form depends on the structural economic and demographic pa-
rameters characterizing the population. Moreover, it is shown that populations
with distinct initial age structures exhibit the same asymptotic age structure,
provided fertility and mortality laws are converging, which requires converging
terms of trade between coexisting generations in the populations under study.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
examines the long-run production dynamics. The dynamics of age structures is
studied in Section 4. Section 5 provides a numerical illustration on the basis of
France (1816-2008), and extrapolates the long-run age structure under several
postulates for the survival process. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Environment
Let us consider a three-period OLG model. Each period of life has a length
normalized to 1.
All agents live the rst period of life for sure. This consists of a period of
childhood, during which the child does not produce anything, and benets from
the resources of his parent.
A proportion 1t+1 of the cohort born at time t will enjoy the second period
of life. That period is a period of young adulthood, during which agents work,
help their parents and educate their children. Reproduction is monosexual.
Finally, only a proportion 2t+2 of the part of the cohort that survived to the
second period will reach the third period of life. That period is a period during
which agents are retired, and live thanks to the generosity of their children.
In this model, life expectancy at birth is: (1   1t+1)1 + 1t+1(1   2t+2)2 +
1t+1
2
t+2(3) = 1 + 
1
t+1 + 
1
t+1
2
t+2.
Children born at time t inherit, during their rst period of life, ht units of
human capital from their parents.
2.2 Survival conditions
Survival conditions at all ages are assumed to be shaped by the current stock
of human capital, i.e. the stock of knowledge prevailing at the time of existence
of the agents.10 Formally, the probability of survival to the second period of
life of a person born at t  1, denoted by 1t , depends positively on the stock of
human capital ht by means of the survival function:
1t  1(ht) (1)
where 1(ht) exhibits the following properties: 1(:)  0, 10(:) > 0 and
100(:) < 0. We assume also that 1(ht) is bounded from below and from above:
limht!0 
1(ht) = ~
1 > 0 and limht!1 
1(ht) = 
1 < 1.
10This assumption di¤ers from the postulate according to which individual longevity de-
pends on the human capital stock prevailing at the birth of the agent. In our setting, agents
do, on the contrary, benet from the advances of knowledge during their whole life.
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Similarly, the probability of survival from the second to the third period of
life, 2t , depends positively on the stock of human capital:
2t  2(ht) (2)
with 2(:)  0, 20(:) > 0, 200(:) < 0, limht!0 20(ht) <1, and limht!1 20(ht) =
0. We assume also limht!0 
2(ht) = ~
2 > 0 and limht!1 
2(ht) = 
2 < 1.
2.3 Production
At the young adult age, (surviving) agents produce a good, according to a
technology that is assumed, for simplicity, to be linear in human capital:
yt = wht (3)
where yt denotes the output per head, while w is the wage per unit of human
capital. For the sake of the presentation, this wage will be normalized to unity
in the rest of this paper (i.e. w = 1).
The stock of human capital ht+1 depends on the past human capital ht,
and on the amount of education expenditures that each adult dedicates to the
education of each child, as follows
ht+1 = A

etht
nt

h1 t (4)
where et is the fraction of parental income ht dedicated to education, nt is
the number of children, A is a productivity parameter (A > 0), while  is the
elasticity of ht+1 to education spending per child (i.e. 0 <  < 1).
2.4 Agentsdecisions
Young adults work during the second period, and decide the number of children
nt and the fraction of their income dedicated to education et.11 But before
considering those decisions, let us rst specify intergenerational transfers.
Intergenerational transfers Following Ehrlich and Lui (1991), it is as-
sumed that young adult agents must take care of their family: children (con-
sumption and education) and old parents (consumption only). Contributions
to the consumption of other family members are compulsory, and each young
adult takes the family contribution rates as given.12
Each young adult must give a proportion t of his resources to each of his
nt children, to cover food and clothing costs, as well as other expenditures (e.g.
toys, leisure activities, travel, etc.). That fraction is a function of the level of
human capital prevailing at the time of the birth of the child:
t  (ht) (5)
where 0 < t < 1 for any ht. We thus allow here for a non-constancy of the
(relative) child cost, which may vary with the level of human capital. The
11That decision structure is close to the one developed by Erhlich and Lui (1991), where
mortality is exogenous.
12This approach di¤ers from the one of Ehrlich and Lui (1991) in the basic version of their
model, where the contribution rate is chosen by parents under some constraints.
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(relative) contribution to each child is assumed to be bounded from below and
from above: limht!0 (ht) = ~ > 0 and limht!1 (ht) =  < 1. As far as
the precise shape of the function (ht) is concerned, a recent study by Farrell
and Shields (2007) on the behaviour of children as consumers suggests that the
contribution rate t is likely to be non decreasing in the level of income: 
0(ht) 
0. Actually, as shown by Farrell and Shields, while some goods, which represent
a small share of childrens spending, such as drinks, sweets, toys and books, are
normal goods, the goods that represent a larger share of their spending, such
as clothes, travel, and leisure, are luxury goods (i.e. with an income elasticity
larger than 1). In the present one-good model, the elasticity of expenditures
per child with respect to parental income ht, which is equal to 1 +
0(ht)
(ht)
ht, is
larger than 1 if and only if 0(ht)  0. Hence we shall assume, throughout this
paper, that the contribution rate t is non decreasing in ht.
13
Regarding the help to the elderly, it is assumed, for simplicity, that all
young adults must dedicate some xed proportion of their resources to the
old, surviving, cohort, through a social insurance system that pools the risks
of having surviving elderly parents on the whole young adults cohort. Thus,
each young adult, whatever his parent survives or not to the old age, dedicates
a proportion t2t of his resources to the old, surviving, cohort.
14 As for the
help to the children, that fraction t is a function of the level of human capital
prevailing at the time of the retirement of the old:
t  (ht) (6)
where 0 < t < 1 for any ht. Here again, the contribution rate is assumed to be
bounded from below and from above: limht!0 (ht) = ~ > 0 and limht!1 (ht) =
 < 1. As far as the shape of (ht) is concerned, it is reasonable, in the light,
for instance, of the large empirical evidence on the rise of the cost of long term
care (per dependent person) as the economy develops, to assume that the ex-
penditure dedicated to the old is, like the expenditure dedicated to the young,
a non decreasing function of income ht : 
0(ht)  0.15
Budget constraints Each young adult earns an income ht by his work,
and uses that income to help his children and parents. Moreover, a young adult
spends a fraction et of his resources for the higher education of his children
(0  et  1). That fraction is, unlike t, chosen by the adult agent. One can
interpret that asymmetry as reecting the fact that, as far as basic consumption
is concerned, social norms and customs are strongly at work: each society pro-
duces its norms regarding how one has to treat ones children and ones elderly
parents, and those norms are strictly respected. However, parents benet from
a much larger degree of freedom regarding (high) education spending.
Second-period consumption ct is what remains of labour income once inter-
generational transfers and education spending have been paid:
ct = (1  tnt   t2t   et)ht (7)
13We shall also assume, in the rest of this paper, that limht!0 
0(ht) < 1 and
limht!1 
0(ht) = 0.
14 It is only in the special case where there is no elderly people alive (i.e. 2t = 0) that young
adults neglect the previous generation.
15On the rise of the LTC costs per dependent person, see Cutler (1996) and Norton (2000).
Precise gures on the rise of the share of LTC expenditures in GDP can be found in a recent
report by the European Commission (2009).
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This is decreasing in the number of children, and decreasing in the proportion
of survivors among the elderly, 2t . Note, however, that, while the number of
children nt is chosen by agents, the proportion of surviving elderly 2t is not.
A young adult expects also to consume, if he is still alive at the retirement
age, a consumption dt+1, which comes exclusively from the contributions of the
young cohort (for simplicity, there is no savings in this economy):
dt+1 =

t+1
2
t+1ht+1
 nt1t+1
2t+1
= nt
1
t+1t+1ht+1 (8)
The factor in brackets corresponds to what is given by each young adult at
period t+1, while the second factor consists of the ratio of young adults over old
adults. The impact of the young cohorts contribution on the olds consumption
depends thus on the sizes of those two demographic groups.
Optimal fertility and education Agents preferences are assumed to
take a standard log-linear form in second-period and third-period consumptions,
and in the number of children. Agents are also supposed to be expected utility
maximizers, with a zero utility from being dead. Moreover, at the time of their
decisions, agents form myopic anticipations regarding future survival conditions,
and thus believe that the probabilities 1t+1 and 
2
t+1 are equal to the currently
prevailing probabilities, i.e. 1t and 
2
t . Similarly, agents take contributory rates
t and t as given constants, even though these may evolve over time.
16
Hence, if one abstracts from childhood, the expected lifetime welfare is:17
Ut = log(ct) +  log(nt) + 
2
t log(dt+1) (9)
where  captures the relative strength of the taste for children (0 <  < 1).
Note that this expression treats children as consumption goods and investment
goods (through dt+1), but abstracts from any altruistic concerns.18
Substituting for consumption and for the resources at the old age yields:
Ut = log((1  tnt   t2t   et)ht) +  log(nt) + 2t log
 
1tn
1 
t tAe

t ht

(10)
The rst-order condition for optimal fertility is:
nt =
( + 2t (1  ))
 
1  t2t

t (1 +  + 
2
t )
(11)
Optimal fertility is, without surprise, increasing in the taste for children ,
and decreasing in the cost per child t.
19 It is also decreasing in the contribution
16Thus, the young adult expects to benet, once old, from the same relative aid as the one
he o¤ered when being young.
17We abstract here from pure time preferences. Actually, there is not really a need for these
in the present context, where the survival probability 2t acts as a naturaldiscount factor,
assigning lower weight to future consumption on the grounds of its risky nature.
18This model di¤ers thus from Barro and Becker (1989), where altruism towards children
makes parent care about the utility of the whole dynasty following them. In the literature on
endogenous fertility and mortality, see de la Croix and Licandro (2007) on the quality versus
quantity trade-o¤, in a context where parents care about the survival of their children, unlike
the present, purely egoistic context.
19Fertility is here strictly positive, as we have  + 2t (1   ) > 0 for any level of 2t under
 < 1. This interior solution di¤ers from Ehrlich and Lui (1991), where  = 0 and  = 1,
so that a corner solution with the minimum number of surviving children prevails, as the
marginal net return for investing in the quality of children always exceeds the marginal net
return from investing in their quantity.
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rate t: as the contribution to the elderly goes up, parentsavailable resources
are reduced, so that fewer children can be made. The chosen fertility is also
decreasing in the elasticity , which reects the quantity versus quality trade-
o¤. The higher  is, the lower the contribution of the quantity of children to
the elderlys consumption is ceteris paribus.
The impact of the probability of survival 2t on the number of children is
ambiguous, and depends actually on the relative sizes of  - the taste for children
- and t - the contribution to the surviving old -.20 Actually, we have
@nt
@2t
? 0 () (1  )(1  t2t )(1 +  + 2t ) ? ( + 2t (1  )) (t + t + 1)
It is di¢ cult to see the sign of the derivative in general, as this depends on
,  and t. It is only in some polar cases that the sign of @nt=@2t can be
identied. For instance, when  tends to 1, the LHS vanishes to 0, and the RHS
remains positive, so that @nt=@2t < 0. But for lower levels of , things are less
obvious. Note, however, that the demographic transition requires @nt=@2t < 0,
which implies, for a given level of , some restrictions on  and t (see infra).
The rst-order condition for optimal education is:
et =
2t
 
1  t2t

1 +  + 2t
(12)
The optimal fraction et of resources dedicated to education is increasing in
, as we expect. Note also that the optimal education is decreasing in t: the
higher the contribution rate to the old is, the lower the optimal education is
ceteris paribus. The chosen education is also decreasing in the intensity of the
taste for children . Regarding the impact of 2t on education, we have
@et
@2t
? 0 () (1 + )(1  2t2t )  t
 
2t
2 ? 0
Here again, the inuence of the survival probability to the old age is ambigu-
ous. For t tending towards 0, @et=@2t is positive, but once some contribution
is required for the elderly, things become less clear. In the extreme case where
both t and 2t tend towards 1, the derivative is negative. While @et=@
2
t is
decreasing in t, it depends positively on : the higher the taste for the number
of children is, the higher is the e¤ect of 2t on the education spending.
21
In sum, the probability of survival to the old age has here quite ambiguous
e¤ects on the individual fertility and education decisions. This is due to the
twofold role of that survival probability: on the one hand, 2t raises, ceteris
paribus, the contribution to the old, which is likely to restrain fertility and
education investment because of a negative income e¤ect; on the other hand, 2t
raises the expected welfare gains from survival to the old age, which is a stimulus
for more children and more education: this is a standard horizon e¤ect.
Finally, note an interesting property of education spending per child etht=nt:
it is independent from the contribution rate t. Thus, while a rise of the con-
tribution rate to the old reduces optimal fertility and education, this leaves
20This kind of indeterminate result is close to the one in Zhang et al (2001), where the e¤ect
of a higher 2t on fertility depends on whether the taste for the "quantity" of children exceeds
or not the taste for the "quality" of children, which is modelized there as guided by altruism.
21Note that the second-order derivative is negative, so that the inuence of 2t on education,
if positive, must be decreasing with 2t .
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education spending per child unchanged. On the contrary, a rise of the con-
tribution rate to each child t reduces fertility, but leaves education spending
unchanged, implying a rise of education spending per child. The two intergen-
erational contribution rates have thus distinct e¤ects on education spending per
child, and, as we shall now see, on the dynamics of production.
3 Long-run production dynamics
Let us now characterize the long-run production dynamics of the economy under
study. Given that the survival probabilities 1t and 
2
t are, like the output yt,
a function of the human capital stock ht, and that contribution rates t and t
are also functions of ht, it follows that fertility and education are also a function
of ht. Hence, the constancy of the human capital stock ht over time brings the
constancy of all variables: yt, 1t , 
2
t , nt, t, t , et, ct and dt:
Substituting for education and fertility in the human capital accumulation
equation yields:
ht+1 = A

(ht)
2(ht)
 + 2(ht)(1  )

ht  G(ht) (13)
The issue of the existence of a steady-state equilibrium amounts to studying
whether the transition function G(ht) admits a xed point, that is, a human
capital level ht such that G(ht) = ht. Proposition 1 summarizes the long-run
dynamics of the economy under study, which can take three distinct forms.22
Proposition 1 The long-run dynamics of the economy belongs to one of the
three following cases:
 Case 1: if A

~~2
+~2(1 )

< 1 and A

2
+2(1 )

< 1, then h = 0
is the unique steady-state, which is stable: any economy with h0 > 0 will
converge towards h = 0.
 Case 2: if A

~~2
+~2(1 )

< 1 and A

2
+2(1 )

> 1, then there exist
two steady-states: h = 0 and h > 0; h is locally stable, while h is
unstable; any economy with h0 < h will converge towards h = 0, while
any economy with h0 > h will exhibit perpetual growth.
 Case 3: if A

~~2
+~2(1 )

> 1 and A

2
+2(1 )

> 1, then h = 0 is
the unique steady-state, which is unstable. Any economy with h0 > 0 will
exhibit perpetual growth.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Regarding the determinants of the long-run dynamics of human capital and
output, let us rst notice the crucial role played by the elasticity of productivity
with respect to education spending per child, . For instance, Case 3 can hardly
occur for a low level of . The taste for the number of children (i.e. ) plays in
22Note that the case where A

~~2
+~2(1 )

> 1 and A

2
+2(1 )

< 1 cannot occur,
as both 2(ht) and (ht) are non decreasing in ht.
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the other direction, and makes Case 3 less likely, as a strong taste for children
reduces education investment, and lowers human capital accumulation.
The dynamics of output depends also on the contribution function (:), and,
more precisely, on its limit values ~ and . The higher those limit contribution
rates to the children are, the more likely a high (stationary or non-stationary)
equilibrium is, because high contribution rates reduce fertility and favour edu-
cation investment per child. However, the contribution rate to the old, t, does
not a¤ect output dynamics, as education spending per child is invariant to t.
Moreover, the long-run dynamics of output depends on the limit survival
probabilities to the old age ~2 and 2. It might be the case, for instance, that
the survival probability to the old age is low when the human capital is close
to zero, implying that we are in either Case 1 or Case 2, but ~2 does not tell
us everything regarding the long-run dynamics, as this depends also on 2. If
2 is large enough, we can expect to have perpetual output growth (above the
unstable steady-state), whereas the economy will converge towards 0 if 2 is
not high enough. Furthermore, it should be stressed that, although the survival
probability to the old age 2(ht) is a major determinant of output dynamics,
the probability of survival to the young adult age, 1(ht), plays here no role at
all, as it is here neutral for fertility and education decisions.
Proposition 1, which describes the dynamics of human capital and output
under di¤erent cases, can also be used to account for the demographic changes
that took place over the last two centuries, and, in particular, for the demo-
graphic transition. Clearly, as 1(ht) and 2(ht) are increasing functions of
human capital, a growth of ht over time - which occurs in Case 2 for h0 > h
and in Case 3 for any h0 > 0 - must generate a rise in life expectancy. More-
over, provided  is su¢ ciently large and  is su¢ ciently low (which must be
true under Cases 2 and 3), the rise of 2t caused by the growth of ht implies a
fall of fertility. Hence, the long-run dynamics of this model is compatible with
the demographic transition: as human capital accumulates, both mortality and
fertility fall, in conformity with the transition.
Whereas that result is also in line with the one of Blackburn and Cipriani
(2002), it should be stressed that, in our model, the connection between the
mortality decline and the fertility decline depends also, unlike in Blackburn and
Cipriani, on the size of intergenerational transfers. Clearly, we have @nt=@2t < 0
only if  is large and  is low, but, also, provided the contribution rate to the
elderly t is su¢ ciently large. This condition is likely to be satised as human
capital accumulates, but only if 0(ht) = 0 and  is large, or if 0(ht) > 0. Hence
the existence of a large demographic transition imposes some restrictions on the
level and pattern of the upward oriented intergenerational transfers.
4 Age structure dynamics (1): theory
Let us now turn to the predictions of the model regarding the long-run dynamics
of the age structure. For that purpose, we will rst characterize the age structure
by means of age group ratios. Then, we will examine under which conditions the
age structure stabilizes over time, and characterize analytically the asymptotic
age structure. Finally, we will consider the implications of this model regarding
the convergence of populations with distinct initial age structures.
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4.1 The populations age structure
The groups of children, young adult and old adults at time t, denoted by, re-
spectively, N ct , N
y
t , and N
o
t , are equal to
N ct =
 
N ct 1
1
t

nt
Nyt = N
c
t 1
1
t
Not = N
c
t 2
1
t 1
2
t
Hence the age structure of the economy can be summarized by the ratios
t  N
c
t
N ct +N
y
t +N
o
t
=
nt 11tnt
nt 11tnt + nt 11t + 2t
t  N
y
t
N ct +N
y
t +N
o
t
=
nt 11t
nt 11tnt + nt 11t + 2t
t  N
o
t
N ct +N
y
t +N
o
t
=
2t
nt 11tnt + nt 11t + 2t
where t denotes the share of children in the population, t is the share of the
middle-aged, and t is the share of the elderly in the population. In the rest
of this paper, we shall thus denote an age structure by the triplet (t;t;t).
Each ratio, t, t and t, is a function of ht and ht 1, as these depend on past
and current fertility and mortality:
t = (ht; ht 1)
t = (ht; ht 1)
t = (ht; ht 1)
Note that, as age group ratios are functions of current and past human cap-
ital stocks, the study of the stabilization of age structure requires a distinction
between the di¤erent cases mentioned above concerning the dynamics of human
capital. However, as we shall now see, whether the economy lies in Cases 1, 2 or
3 will not make any di¤erence as far as the issue of stabilization is concerned,
but will denitely matter for the precise form of the asymptotic age structure.
4.2 The asymptotic age structure
As stated in Proposition 2, the age structure of the population tends necessarily
to stabilize over time, whatever the long-run dynamics of the economy falls
under Cases 1, 2 or 3. In other words, the ratios t, t and t tend, in the
long-run, to converge towards some constant, stable levels.
Proposition 2 Under Cases 1, 2 or 3, the age structure of the population
(t;t;t) tends asymptotically towards a stable age structure (;;),
where   limt!1 t,   limt!1 t and   limt!1t:
Under h0 > 0, the asymptotic age structure (;;) is
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Cases  
1
~1((+(1 )~2)(1 ~~2))2

(~1;~2;~;~)
~2(~(1++~2))
2

(~1;~2;~;~)
2a: h0 < h
~1((+(1 )~2)(1 ~~2))2

(~1;~2;~;~)
~2(~(1++~2))
2

(~1;~2;~;~)
2b: h0 = h
1(h)((+(1 )2(h))(1 (h)2(h)))2

(1(h);2(h);(h);(h))
2(h)((h)(1++2(h)))
2

(1(h);2(h);(h);(h))
2c: h0 > h
1((+(1 )2)(1 2))2

(1;2;;)
2((1++2))
2

(1;2;;)
3
1((+(1 )2)(1 2))2

(1;2;;)
2((1++2))
2

(1;2;;)
Cases 
1
~1(+(1 )~2)(1 ~~2)~(1++~2)

(~1;~2;~;~)
2a: h0 < h
~1(+(1 )~2)(1 ~~2)~(1++~2)

(~1;~2;~;~)
2b: h0 = h
1(h)(+(1 )2(h))(1 (h)2(h))(h)(1++2(h))

(1(h);2(h);(h);(h))
2c: h0 > h
1(+(1 )2)(1 2)(1++2)

(1;2;;)
3
1(+(1 )2)(1 2)(1++2)

(1;2;;)
where 

 
1; 2; ; 
  1    + (1  )2 (1  2)2+1   + (1  )2 (1 
2)(1 +  + 2) + 2
 
(1 +  + 2)
2
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition behind that asymptotic stabilization result goes as follows.
Fertility rates and mortality rates, although functions of human capital, are
bounded from above and from below, so that even if ht takes extreme values,
this remains compatible with a stationary demography. Thus, given that ratios
t, t and t depend on fertility and mortality rates only, the long-run dynamics
of human capital, by leading to a stabilization of fertility and mortality rates,
implies also a stabilization of the age structure (t;t;t).23
Note, however, that Proposition 2 does not imply that the long-run popu-
lation size is constant. As in Lotka Theorem (1939), the asymptotic constancy
of the age structure does not imply the asymptotic constancy of the population
size: homothetic growth or reduction may occur (depending on whether the
strength of fertility exceeds the one of mortality or not), but the relative sizes
of all age-groups must always remain the same in the long-run.
Regarding the determinants of the asymptotic age structure (;;),
these are of four distinct types: (1) the individual taste for children (i.e. ); (2)
the elasticity of human capital with respect to education spending (i.e. ); (3)
survival functions 1(:) and 2(:); (4) intergenerational contribution functions
(:) and (:).
As far as survival functions 1(:) and 2(:) are concerned, it is worth un-
derlining that, except in Case 2b, only limit-values ~1, 1; ~2 and 2 matter for
the asymptotic age structure, but the other characteristics of survival functions
are irrelevant. Thus, in order to know the long-run proportion of old people in
23 If the long-run equilibrium of human capital is a stationary equilibrium, long-run fertility
and mortality rates are also constant, implying a constant asymptotic age structure. But if
the long-run human capital is not stationary, the boundedness of fertility and mortality will
also make the age structure stabilize over time.
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the population, there is no need, in general, to know the precise shape of the
survival function: only limit values matter.24 Clearly, the limit values ~1 and 1
contribute to raise the long-run proportion of young people , and to decrease
the long-run proportion of old persons , while the e¤ect on the long-run pro-
portion of middle aged agents  is ambiguous. On the contrary, limit values
~2 and 2 have exactly the opposite e¤ects.
Contribution rates (:) and (:) have also signicant e¤ects on the asymptotic
age structure.25 The impacts of (:) and (:) are quite di¤erent: whereas the
former decreases the proportion of the young and raises the ones of the middle-
aged and the elderly, the latter reduces the proportions of the young and the
middle aged, but raises the one of the elderly. That inuence of intergenerational
trade is worth being underlined. True, it was often stressed, following the work
by Ehrlich and Lui (1991), that the scope and form of intergenerational trade
depend on the age structure. But that relation is here two-directional : the
age structure is also inuenced by intergenerational trade, that is, by what
each adult gives to his children and surviving parents, because fertility and
education are determined by contribution rates t and t. A corollary of this is
that any attempt to forecast the asymptotic age structure must consider how
intergenerational relations are evolving when human capital accumulates. That
will be the task of the next section, but, before that, let us come back on the
issue of the convergence between populations with distinct initial age structures.
4.3 The convergence between di¤erent populations
As this was stressed in Section 1, Lotka Theorem (1939) states that, under
identical, constant fertility and mortality laws, populations tend to "forget their
past": whatever their initial age structure was, these exhibit, in the long-run,
the same age structure. This result was extended by Lopez (1961), who showed
that, to obtain the convergence towards a given age structure, it is not necessary
that populations are subject to the same time-invariant fertility and mortality
laws, but, only, to the same (possibly time-varying) fertility and mortality laws.
Proposition 3 suggests that, in general, the convergence of two populations to-
wards the same age structure does not even require populations to be subject
to the same (possibly time-varying) fertility and mortality laws: only the as-
ymptotic convergence of those laws is required.
Proposition 3 Take two populations A and B with the same structural pa-
rameters

; ; ~1; 1; ~2; 2
	
and the same contribution functions (ht) and
(ht), but with di¤erent initial age structures
 
A0 ;
A
0 ;
A
0

and
 
B0 ;
B
0 ;
B
0

,
and with distinct initial human capital levels hA0 > 0 and h
B
0 > 0. We assume 
A0 ;
A
0 ;
A
0
 6=  B0 ;B0 ;B0  and hA0 < hB0 .
 Under Cases 1 and 3, A and B exhibit the same asymptotic age structure.
 Under Case 2,
- if hA0 < h
B
0 < h
, A and B exhibit the same asymptotic age structure.
24On the contrary, under Case 2b, the long-run age structure depends on the level of the
steady-state human capital, so that the precise shape of the survival function matters (and
not only limit-values).
25Here again, only limit values matter, except in Case 2b.
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- if hA0 < h
 < hB0 , A and B do not exhibit the same asymptotic age
structure.
- if h < hA0 < h
B
0 , A and B exhibit the same asymptotic age structure.
Proof. The proof follows from Propositions 1 and 2. It is straightforward
to see that, in Cases 1 and 3, h0 does not inuence the long-run level of fertility
and mortality, so that the asymptotic age structure must be the same for all
economies, whatever their initial conditions were. However, regarding Case 2,
the convergence of age structures across populations requires the initial levels
of human capital to be on the same side of the (unstable) steady-state h.
Otherwise, the convergence of age structure cannot occur.
Proposition 3 states that, if we exclude the Case 2 where hA0 < h
 < hB0 ,
two populations with di¤erent initial conditions will necessarily end up with
the same long-run age structure. This convergence does not require that the
two populations follow the same fertility and mortality rates. Clearly, under
di¤erent initial levels of human capital, the two populations will exhibit di¤er-
ent fertility rates and mortality rates, but those populations will nonetheless
converge asymptotically towards the same age structure, as fertility rates and
mortality rates will tend to converge as human capital evolves over time. Hence,
to have a convergence of age structures, what is required is not identical (pos-
sibly time-varying) fertility and mortality laws, but, merely converging fertility
and mortality laws. This - weaker - condition is satised for various initial con-
ditions, but it is true that, if the structural parameters of the economies under
study (assumed to be identical) are such that Case 2 holds, then, if we have hA0
< h < hB0 , the convergence of fertility and mortality will not take place, and
the age structures of populations A and B will remain di¤erent.
Although Proposition 3 suggests that the convergence of populations towards
the same age structure is likely (except for populations with extremely di¤erent
initial levels of human capital under Case 2), it should be stressed, however,
that this convergence remains conditional on populations exhibiting the same
structural parameters. Actually, asymptotic age structures depend on the elas-
ticity , on the taste for children , on the limit survival probabilities and on the
contribution functions (:) and (:). If, for any reason, the populations under
study di¤er on these, then the long-run age structure will also di¤er.
5 Age structure dynamics (2): back to history
Let us now turn back to the empirical data on the evolution of age structures
across epochs, to investigate to what extent the present, simple framework can
replicate the observed dynamics of demographic ratios over time. Moreover,
turning back to the data will also be an opportunity to cast a new light on the
precise form of the long-run equilibrium age structure under plausible assump-
tions on the structural parameters of the economy.
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5.1 Functional forms
For that purpose, we need to postulate some functional forms for survival func-
tions. For simplicity, we shall assume that 1(ht) and 2(ht) take the forms:
1(ht) = ~
1 +
(1   ~1)ht
1 + ht
2(ht) = ~
2 +
(2   ~2)ht
1 + ht
where  and  are positive parameters. Those functional forms satisfy the
properties stated in Section 2: limht!0 
1(ht) = ~
1 > 0; limht!1 
1(ht) =
1 < 1; limht!0 
2(ht) = ~
2 > 0 and limht!1 
2(ht) = 
2 < 1.
Regarding the contribution rates to each child and to each old, we assume
(ht) = ~ +
(   ~)ht
1 + ht
(ht) = ~ +
(   ~)ht
1 + ht
where we have 0 < ~   < 1 and 0 < ~   < 1, while  and  are non-negative
parameters, implying that the parental contribution rate to each child and each
elderly is non-decreasing in human capital.
5.2 Calibration
In this subsection, we calibrate our model in such a way as to t the data
concerning the economic growth process and the demographic evolutions in
France (1816-2008). Clearly, this emphasis on a particular economy involves a
signicant simplication, as economic and demographic evolutions do not have
exactly the same timing and the same size across countries. This simulation
exercise has thus no pretension to exhaustiveness.
As far as the lower bounds of survival probabilities are concerned, we shall
assume that ~1 = 0:018 and ~2 = 0:005, which implies a life expectancy at
birth equal to 1 + 0:018 + (0:018  0:005) = 1:018, which is close to 36 years.
Regarding the upper bounds of survival probabilities, demographers disagree
on the existence or non-existence of some maximum age at death, and on its
level (see Lee, 2003). We shall assume here that 1 = 0:95 and 2 = 0:6, which
implies a maximum life expectancy at birth equal to 1+0:95+(0:950:6) = 2:52,
which is close to 88 years. This calibration, which can be regarded as based on
a pessimistic scenario, will serve only as a benchmark.
Regarding the calibration of , we rely on fertility estimates in the early
19th century. These estimates point to about 6 children per women. However,
France started its demographic transition far before other countries, and fertility
started falling there already at the end of the 18th century. Actually, at the
beginning of the 19th century, the total fertility rate in France was about 4.5
children per women, so that n = 2:25.26
From the optimal fertility, we have, under 2 = ~2,
2:25 =
( + 0:005(1  0:23)) (1  t(0:005))
t (1 +  + 0:005)
26See Binion (2000).
16
We know that t must take a low value, given that transfers in developing
economies are generally ascendants (i.e. from children to parents), while t
should be higher. Fixing t = ~ = 0:03 and t =  = 0:1 yields  = 0:069:
Regarding the calibration of production parameters A and , note that,
according to Maddison (2008), real GDP per capita was equal to about 1,135 $ in
1820 in France (in international Geary-Khamis 1990 $), and to 22,675 $ in 2008.
Hence the annual average compound growth rate of real GDP per capita is equal
to
 
22675
1135
 1
186   1 = 0:0162 = 1:62% per year. Given that periods are here 35
years long, this coincides with a periodic growth factor of (1:0162)35 = 1:75498.
Hence we have
ht+1
ht
= A

(ht)
2(ht)
 + 2(ht)(1  )

= 1:75498
Regarding the calibration of the parameter , it should be rst reminded that
 can be interpreted as the elasticity of output per capita growth with respect
to the share of income per head dedicated to education per child.27 Given that,
according to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), the elasticity of output per capita
growth with respect to the share of income dedicated to education is close to
0.23 when controlling for fertility, we shall assume here that  equals 0.23.
Assuming average 2 equal to 0.15 and average  = 0:1 and substituting for
 and  yields:
A = 1:75498

0:069 + (0:15)(0:77)
0:1(0:23)(0:15)
0:23
which yields A = 4:383. Thus we shall, throughout this numerical exercise,
use this value for the productivity parameter A, and use also, for convenience,
h0 = 1 as a starting value for the stock of human capital.
The table below summarizes the calibration in the benchmark case.
Parameters  A h0  ~  ~1 1 ~2 2
Values 0:230 4:383 1:000 0:069 0:030 0:100 0:018 0:950 0:005 0:600
5.3 Results
In order to replicate the past trend of the age structure in France (1816-2008),
various combinations of the - so far non calibrated - parameters , , , ~, 
and  can be used. Given that there is no space here to provide an exhaustive
study of the age structure patterns associated to all sets of parameters, we shall
conne ourselves here to select some parameters values allowing us to replicate
the observed trend of the age structure over 1816-2008, and, then, to extrapolate
from those parameters the future age structure pattern.
If we set  = 0:5 and  = 0:12 in the survival functions 1(:) and 2(:), it
is possible to replicate the age structures of the early 19th century and the late
27 Indeed, we have
ht+1 ht
ht
= A

et
nt
   1, where et is the fraction of yt dedicated to the
education of all children, so that the ratio in brackets is the share of income given to the
education of a child.
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20th century, under a light growth of the contribution rate to each child (i.e.
 = 0:230,  = 0:15), and under a constancy of the contribution rate to the
elderly (~ = 0:1,  = 0). The result of that simulation is shown on Figure 4.28
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Figure 4: Age structure in France: simulated long-run dynamics
Figure 4 shows, for France, the past, present and future age structures that
are associated with the above calibration of the model. It is the equivalent of
Figure 3 in Section 1, but simulated from the model, and extending the time
horizon beyond the actual data (stopping in 2008), until 2400. Note rst that,
in comparison with Figure 3, Figure 4 shows a dynamics of age structure that
is smoother than the actual one for the 19th and the 20th century. Given that
our model is concerned only with long-run evolutions, this does not come as a
surprise, but is not problematic for the issue at stake.
Regarding the future, the model predicts a stabilization of the age structure
around year 2150, at a level that is signicantly di¤erent from the one prevailing
today. Actually, the current proportion of the French population older than 70
years is about 11 percent, while the relative size of that group will stabilize at
about 17.4 percent. That rise of the proportion of the elderly is naturally made
at the cost of the two other age groups, and, in particular, of the young.
How plausible is the above picture as a predictor of future age structure in
France? Actually, Figure 4 derives its plausibility not only from its ability to t
the past trend of the age structure, but, also, from the fact that the predicted
trends are not a simple empirically-based extrapolation from past data, but are
rooted in a theoretical model. However, despite this, one may argue that there
exist various combinations of parameters that may t with the past data, so
that there is no unique possible future picture. In particular, the above picture
was based on a pessimistic scenario concerning maximum longevity prospects,
which may be questioned, as we shall now discuss.
5.4 Pessimistic versus optimistic scenarios
The simulations carried out above relied on 1 = 0:95 and 2 = 0:6, which
implied a maximum life expectancy at birth equal to about 88 years. That
assumption is fully compatible with the views defended by the least optimistic
demographers (see Olshanksy and Carnes, 2001). While such a life expectancy
28Note that, under those parameters values, the economy falls under Case 2 of Section 3.
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is signicantly higher than the one prevailing today, one may argue that such a
limitation of longevity is hardly plausible, and that there is no obvious reason
why the accumulation of knowledge would not allow for further expansions of
the human lifespan. That questioning of "pessimistic" scenarios on longevity
limits has been made, among others, by Oeppen and Vaupel (2002).
Within the present model, that questioning can be captured by raising the
limit probabilities 1 and 2, that is, the values of 1(ht) and 2(ht) when
ht tends to innity. In order to explore the impact of raising 1 and 2, we
computed the evolution of age structure, still for France, under the assumptions
1 = 0:99 and 2 = 0:8, corresponding to a limit life expectancy at birth of 97
years, and contrasted the age structure dynamics with the one under 1 = 0:99
and 2 = 0:99, corresponding to a limit life expectancy at birth of 104 years.
Figures 5 and 6 show the age structure dynamics resulting from those two
alternative assumptions on limit survival conditions.29
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Figure 5: Max life expectancy = 97 years
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Figure 6: Max life expectancy = 104 years
When comparing Figure 5 with Figure 4, there does not seem to be a major
change, except that the long-run proportion of agents older than 70 years is
signicantly increased under 1 = 0:99 and 2 = 0:8: this grows from about
17.4 percent of the population to 18.2 percent, which is a statistically signi-
cant change. Under the most optimistic scenario, i.e. 2 = 0:99, the long-run
proportion of people older than 70 years is also larger, and equal to 19.6 percent.
Those signicant changes show the sensitivity of the forecasts to the as-
sumptions made on maximum life expectancy. That point being stressed, the
sensitivity of forecasts should not be exaggerated: the changes in the long-
run composition of the population induced by variations in 1and 2 remain
of relatively small sizes with respect to the benchmark case. Thus, although
the long-run age structure depends on limit survival probabilities, and, as such,
relies on some non-observable assumptions, there are no extreme di¤erentials be-
tween the forecasts obtained under various scenarios. True, the optimistic one
makes the elderly represent about 20 % of the population, which is enormous in
comparison with what prevails today. But even in the pessimistic scenario, with
29Note that, in each case, the parameter  in 2(ht) had to be modied, in order to still
have a compatibility of the simulated age structures with the observations for the 19th and
20th centuries.  is now assumed to be equal to 0.08 under 2 = 0:80, and equal to 0.06 under
2 = 0:99:
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a maximum life expectancy of 88 years, the old will represent more than 17.4
percent of the whole population near 2150, which is much larger than today.
Moreover, large changes in limit survival probabilities do not seem to a¤ect
strongly the dynamics of the adjustment towards the long-run age structure.
Under each scenario, the age structure will stabilize in the middle of the 22nd
century, and this timing is invariant to changes in the limit survival probabilities.
6 Concluding remarks
The goal of this paper was to study the dynamics of age heterogeneity, and,
in particular, to examine whether the asymptotic stabilization results of Lotka
(1939) and Lopez (1961) still hold when fertility and mortality are endogenous.
We wanted also to characterize the form of the asymptotic age structure.
For those purposes, we studied a three-period OLG economy with human
capital accumulation and endogenous fertility and mortality, and where coex-
isting generations are linked through intergenerational trade. In that model,
children are treated both as a consumption good and as an investment good.
We showed that the long-run dynamics of output is determined by the intensity
of the taste for children, the elasticity of future human capital with respect to
education spending, the limit values of the survival probability to the old age
and of the cost of raising a child.
It was also shown that the age structure will necessarily converge asymp-
totically towards some particular form, determined by the fundamentals of the
economy. Regarding the factors determining the asymptotic age structure, this
model highlighted the crucial roles played by limit values of the survival func-
tions to the young adulthood and old adulthood, as well as the inuence of
contribution rates to the children and to the elderly. What the asymptotic age
heterogeneity will be depends on what the intergenerational terms of trade are.
Note that the addition of postulates on the determinants of fertility and
mortality does not only allow us to cast a new light on the precise form of the
asymptotic age structure, but allows us also to reconsider the assumptions that
guarantee the convergence of populations with distinct age structures towards a
unique age structure. While Lopez (1961) argued that such a convergence holds
when populations are subject to the same time-varying fertility and mortality
laws, we show that this convergence holds as long as fertility and mortality laws
are merely converging across nations, convergence which requires converging
terms of trade between generations in all populations.
The model was then used to replicate numerically the past evolution of the
age structure in France (1816-2008), and to extract, from that evolution, the
future evolution of the age structure over 2008-2400. We showed that the model
can approximate the long-run trend of the age structure over the period. Apply-
ing the model to the future yields also some forecasts, under various scenarios
regarding the maximum life expectancy that can be reached. The age structure
at which the French population will stabilize is signicantly sensitive to the pos-
tulated limit survival probabilities, but that sensitivity is of limited size, and
the timing of the adjustment - around 2150 - is robust to the di¤erent scenarios.
To conclude, it should be stressed that this model su¤ers from some restric-
tions, which invite further research. First, the microfoundations of fertility and
education are here purely egoistic, and, as such, complement the works inspired
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by Barro and Becker (1989). This way of looking at the fertility decision is not
neutral, and it would be worth reconsidering the age structure dynamics in a
Barro-Becker type of economy, where intergenerational relations involve altruis-
tic concerns. Secondly, this paper still relies on some postulate on the maximum
longevity, xed to three periods (i.e. equivalent to 105 years). This limitation
plays a major role in the possibility to demonstrate the asymptotic stabilization
of age structures. Moreover, replacing it by some other, weaker postulate would
introduce new parameters in the asymptotic age structure. Hence much work
remains to be done on long-run age structure dynamics.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Long-run output dynamics
The question of the existence of a steady-state equilibrium can be reformulated
as whether the transition function G(ht) admits a xed point. Let us thus study
the properties of G(ht).
Note rst that, given A > 0, we have G(ht)  0. We can also see that
G(0) = 0.
The ratio G(ht)=ht, equal to
G(ht)=ht = A

(ht)
2(ht)
 + 2(ht)(1  )

is increasing in ht, as the ratio in brackets is increasing in ht under 0(ht)  0.
Moreover, we have, under limht!1 
2(ht) = 
2 < 1 and limht!1 (ht) =
 < 1:
lim
ht!1
G(ht)=ht = A

2
 + 2(1  )

which can be larger or smaller than unity, depending on whether:
lim
ht!1
G(ht)=ht Q 1 () A

2
 + 2(1  )

Q 1
The derivative G0(ht) is:
G0(ht) = A

(ht)
2(ht)
+2(ht)(1 )

+htA

(ht)
2(ht)
+2(ht)(1 )
 1(ht)20(ht)+0(ht)2(ht)(+2(ht)(1 ))
[+2(ht)(1 )]2

so that G0(ht)  0.
Note that, under limht!0 
2(ht) = ~
2 > 0, 0 < limht!0 
20(ht) < 1, and
limht!0 
0(ht) <1 , we have:
lim
ht!0
G0(ht) = A

~~2
 + ~2(1  )
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We are now in position to prove Proposition 1.
In Case 1, G(ht) is below the 45 line in the neighborhood of 0 (as G(0) = 0
and limht!0G
0(ht) < 1), and remains below the 45 line when ht tends to +1
(as limht!1G(ht)=ht < 1). Thus, given that G
0(ht)  0, and that G(ht)=ht is
increasing in ht, G(ht) always remains below the 45 line, so that no positive
steady-state exists.
In Case 2, G(ht) is also below the 45 line in the neighborhood of 0, but
lies above the 45 line when ht tends to +1 (as limht!1G(ht)=ht > 1). As
a consequence, given the continuity of G(ht), it must be the case that G(ht)
crosses the 45 line at least once at a positive h = h. Regarding the uniqueness
of that non-trivial steady-state, one cannot a priori rule out the existence of
several steady-states, as no functional form is imposed on the survival function.
The uniqueness of a positive steady-state equilibrium under Case 2 can be
proved by reductio ad absurdum. Let us assume that h is not the unique
strictly positive steady-state equilibrium. As G(ht) rst crosses the 45 line
from below, the multiplicity of steady-states would imply that G(ht) would have
to cross the 45 line from above at least once, and, then, again, from below,
as we know that limht!1G(ht)=ht > 1. Let us denote by h
+ the intermediate
steady-state, which is obtained when G(ht) crosses the 45 line from above.
Given that G(ht) crosses the 45 line from above at h+, it must be the case that
this equilibrium is locally stable. However, at that steady-state, G0(h+) is
G0(h+) = A

(h+)2(h+)
+2(h+)(1 )

+h+A

(h+)2(h+)
+2(h+)(1 )
 1(h+)20(h+)+0(h+)2(h+)(+2(h+)(1 ))
[+2(h+)(1 )]2

At that steady-state, we have, by denition, G(h+) = h+, so that the rst
term, equal to G(h+)=h+, equals 1. But given that the second term of G0(h+) is,
under 0(h+)  0, strictly positive, we have jG0(h+)j > 1, which is incompatible
with the stability of the steady-state. Thus a contradiction is reached. If a
non-zero steady-state exists, this must be unstable. Hence, if G(ht) rst crosses
the 45 line from below, it cannot cross it again from above. But given that
limht!1G(ht)=ht > 1, the transition function must end up above the 45
 line,
so that there must be a unique steady-state equilibrium. Hence h is the unique
positive steady-state. That steady-state is clearly unstable, as G(ht) crosses the
45 line from below, so that an economy starting with h0 < h will converge
towards 0, while an economy with h0 > h will exhibit perpetual growth. That
instability appears clearly if one substitutes h+ for h in the above formula.
We necessarily have jG0(h)j > 1, in conformity with instability.
In Case 3, G(ht) is above the 45 line in the neighborhood of 0, and remains
above the 45 line when ht tends to +1. Thus, given that G0(ht)  0, and that
G(ht)=ht is increasing in ht, it always remains above the 45 line, so that no
positive steady-state exists: the economy exhibits eternal growth.
8.2 Long-run age structure dynamics
To demonstrate Proposition 2, let us consider the 3 cases studied in Section 3,
and show that, in each case, the demographic ratios t, t and t tend towards
constant levels ,  and .
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Under Case 1, we know that limt!1 ht = 0. Hence, we have:
lim
t!1nt =
 
 + (1  )~2 (1  ~~2)
~(1 +  + ~2)
which is, under ~2 > 0, a positive constant. Note that also limt!1 nt 1 =
limt!1 nt =
(+(1 )~2)(1 ~~2)
~(1++~2)
.
Hence, the ratio t tends, in the long-run, towards:
lim
t!1t =
~1

(+(1 )~2)(1 ~~2)
~(1++~2)
2
~1

(+(1 )~2)(1 ~~2)
~(1++~2)
2
+ ~1 (+(1 )~
2)(1 ~~2)
~(1++~2)
+ ~2
= 
which is a positive constant, as ~1; ~2; ~ and ~ are positive constants.
The same kind of rationale can be used to show that t and t tend towards
constant levels  and . As a consequence, the entire age structure (t;t;t)
tends towards an equilibrium age structure (;;).
Under Case 2a, i.e., Case 2 with h0 < h, we have limt!1 ht = 0. Hence
the same conclusions as in Case 1 hold.
Under Case 2b, that is, Case 2 with h0 = h, we know that limt!1 ht = h.
Thus we have
lim
t!1nt =
 
 + (1  )2(h) (1  (h)2(h))
(h)(1 +  + 2(h))
which is a positive constant. Note that also limt!1 nt 1 = limt!1 nt. Hence,
the ratio t tends, in the long-run, towards:
limt!1 t =
1(h)
 
(+(1 )2(h))(1 (h)2(h))
(h)(1++2(h))
!2

(+(1 )2(h))(1 (h)2(h))
(h)(1++2(h))
2
1(h)+1(h) (
+(1 )2(h))(1 (h)2(h))
(h)(1++2(h)) +
2(h)
= 
which is, given that 1(h), 2(h), (h) and (h) are positive con-
stants, a positive constant.
The same kind of rationale can be used to show that t and t tend towards
constant levels  and .
Under Case 2c, that is, Case 2 with h0 > h, we know that limt!1 ht =
+1. Thus we have
lim
t!1nt =
 
 + (1  )2 (1  2)
(1 +  + 2)
which is a positive constant. Note that also limt!1 nt 1 = limt!1 nt.
Hence, the ratio t tends, in the long-run, towards:
lim
t!1t =
1

(+(1 )2)(1 2)
(1++2)
2
1

(+(1 )2)(1 2)
(1++2)
2
+ 1 (+(1 )
2)(1 2)
(1++2) + 
2
= 
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which is, given that 1, 2,  and  are positive constants, a positive constant.
The same kind of rationale can be used to show that t and t tend towards
constant levels  and .
Finally, regarding Case 3, we know that limt!1 ht = +1, so that the same
rationale as in Case 2c applies.
25
